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Macroprudential Regulation and Bank Performance: 
Evidence from India 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, countries have put a lot of emphasis on financial sector reforms as a 
means to improve the overall functioning of the sector. Such reforms have encompassed a 
significant gamut of measures, including lowering of statutory reserve requirements, 
deregulation of interest rates, introduction of measures relating to income recognition, loan 
classification and provisioning, allowing more liberal entry of foreign banks and diversifying 
the ownership base of state-owned banks. The evidence emanating from empirical research 
is admittedly mixed. One set of studies find that financial deregulation leads to an increase 
in the resilience and performance of the banking sector (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Das and 
Ghosh, 2006, 2009; Yeyati and Micco, 2007), while others find that the net effect of financial 
deregulation on the banking sector to be negative (Keeley, 1990; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 
1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999).  
The existing literature tends to look at each macroprudential measure in isolation, 
thereby ignoring the effect of these measures in totality on bank performance. For instance, 
there are studies that examine the impact of removal of interest rate ceilings on the banking 
sector (Kwan, 2002; Feyzioglu et al., 2009). Several others consider the effect of prudential 
regulations on bank risk and performance (Matutes and Vives, 2000; Hellmann et al., 2000; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Agoraki et al., 2011). None of the studies take a holistic view on 
the different macroprudential measures on bank performance. As Allen and Gale (2004) 
observe, since the aspects of performance, stability, efficiency and soundness of banks are 
inter-related, careful consideration of all important prudential measures is important for 
sound empirical analysis. 
In this context, the paper investigates how various measures of macroprudential 
regulation affect the performance of the banking sector. More specifically, we consider the 
impact of three major dimensions of macroprudential regulation – capital adequacy ratio, 
provisioning norms and loan classification requirements - on the performance of the Indian 
banking system. We employ four indicators on which to assess the impact: return on asset 
(RoA) as the profitability measure, net interest margin (NIM) as the measure of economic 
efficiency, Z-score as the measure of bank stability and finally, advances growth 
(Gr_Advances) as a measure of bank business.  
India provides a compelling case among emerging markets to examine this issue in 
some detail. First, beginning from the early 1990s, the country has experienced significant 
liberalization of the banking sector. These liberalisation measures were premised on the 
objectives of enhancing efficiency, productivity and profitability of banks (Government of 
India, 1991; 1998). Second, India is one of the largest and fastest growing emerging 
economies with a gamut of banks across different ownership categories. It would be of 
interest to examine the impact of different regulatory measures on the performance of banks 
across different ownership groups. Third, a comprehensive and reliable banking database for 
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an extended time span is available for Indian banks. The time-series and cross-sectional 
variation in the data makes it amenable to rigorous statistical analysis. Additionally, the time 
period of the study, beginning 1992, coincides with the inception of economic reforms. As a 
result, it permits us to clearly ascertain the impact of regulatory reforms on the performance 
of Indian banks. These findings might provide useful leads to other emerging market banks 
to examine the impact of relevant measures on bank performance across different ownership 
groups.   
The paper combines several strands of literature. The first strand is the effect of 
macroprudential measures on bank performance. Several papers have analyzed the impact 
of capital requirements on bank risk and performance variables. Employing a partial 
adjustment framework, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) uncovered evidence to suggest that 
regulation was effective in the sense that undercapitalized banks (i.e., with capital ratios of 
less than 7 per cent)  increased their capital ratios by more than 100 basis points per annum 
as compared to other banks. Studies for non-US banks, including UK (Ediz et al., 1998), 
Switzerland (Rime, 2001) and India (Ghosh et al., 2003) also provide support to the efficacy 
of capital regulation. In contrast to these studies, we examine the impact of a whole gamut 
of macroprudential measures on bank behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, this is one 
of the earliest studies to systematically study the impact of macroprudential regulations on 
bank behaviour.  
Second, the paper is related to the literature on the evolution of the Indian banking 
sector in the post-deregulation era and on the characterization of the state-owned banks in 
India (Banerjee et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010; Zhao, 2010; Cole, 2011). The 
analysis by Banerjee et al (2004) appears to suggest that Indian state-owned banks do not 
provide adequate credit to the private sector. Berger et al. (2008) examine relationship 
lending across bank ownership and finds that state-owned banks to be the main bank for 
state-owned firms; while foreign banks are less likely to lend to small and opaque firms. 
Gormley (2010) finds that cherry-picking by foreign banks might lead domestic firms to 
obtain less credit, because of the drop in domestic lending. Cole (2011) demonstrates that 
the growth rate of agricultural credit provided by state-owned banks is 5-10 percentage 
points higher in election years. The present paper complements these findings by focusing 
on the impact of several prudential measures and comparing the response across bank 
ownership.  
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
Indian financial sector reforms. The relevant literature is covered in Section 3. The data and 
methods are detailed in Section 4, followed by discussion of the results. The final section 
concludes. 
 
2. The Indian banking system and regulatory environment 
The Indian banking system is characterized by a large number of banks with mixed 
ownership. As at end-2012, the commercial banking segment comprised of 87 banks, 
including 26 state-owned banks (SOBs), 20 domestic private banks, including seven de novo 
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private and 34 foreign banks. Total bank assets constituted over 90 per cent of GDP in 2011-
12. In 1991, on the eve of financial reforms, SOBs share in total banking assets was a little 
over 90 per cent. 
Prior to financial reforms beginning 1992, the financial system in India essentially 
catered to the needs of planned economic development. The Government played an 
overarching role in every sphere of economic activity. High levels of reserve requirements 
pre-empted a large proportion of bank deposits.  Likewise, a system of administered interest 
rate regime resulted in low-quality financial intermediation. The availability of concessional 
credit to selected sectors resulted in cross-subsidization such that the interest rates charged 
to borrowers were not commensurate with the underlying risks. Likewise, the inflexibilities in 
branch licensing and rigid management structures impeded the operational independence 
of banks. The overall consequence was an inefficient allocation of scarce resources.   
As a consequence of these measures, the competitive pressures on the banking 
industry have increased. For example, the five-bank asset concentration ratio has declined 
from over 0.50 in 1991-92 to less than 0.40 in 2008-09. The banking sector has also become 
more diversified with an increasing number of private and foreign players (See for instance, 
Prasad and Ghosh, 2005). Reflecting the efficiency of intermediation, the net interest income 
has declined from over 3 per cent of total assets to close to 2 per cent (Table 1). 
Table 1: Summary of the Banking Industry: 1991-92 to 2011-12 ( billion) 
Year / Bank Group 
1991-92 1997-98 2011-12 
SOB DPB FB SOB DPB FB SOB DPB FB 
No. of banks 27 25 24 27 33 42 28 20 41 
Total asset 3020 143 252 5317 695 429 60380 16778 5836 
Total deposit 2359 123 173 5317 695 429 50020 11746 2771 
Total credit 1440 64 93 2599 354 293 38783 9664 2298 
Credit-deposit ratio (%) 61.1 52.4 54.1 48.9 51.0 68.3 77.5 82.3 8.9 
Share (in per cent)           
    Total asset 88.4 4.2 7.4 81.6 10.2 8.2 72.8 20.2 7.0 
    Total deposit 88.9 4.6 6.5 82.5 10.8 6.7 77.5 18.2 4.3 
    Total credit 90.1 4.0 5.8 80.1 10.9 9.0 76.4 19.0 4.5 
Total income 344 15 38 677 95 87 5351 1585 472 
 of which: 
    interest income 
308 14 29 591 79 68 4847 1340 363 
Total expenditure 289 12 25 574 76 62 4188 1201 287 
 of which: 
    interest expenses 
210 8 19 402 59 42 3285 868 152 
Provisions 47 2 9 53 10 19 668 156 91 
Net profit  8 1 4 5 8 6 495 227 94 
Bank asset/GDP (%) 50.7 50.6 93.7 
SOB =State-owned banks; DPB= Domestic private banks; FB=Foreign banks 
 
Three salient macroprudential measures have characterized the process of financial 
reforms. The first has been the tightening of capital adequacy norms for banks. Driven by the 
imperatives of liberalization, the capital-to risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR) for banks was 
raised to 8 per cent in 1996. More specifically, while Indian banks with international presence 
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and foreign banks were directed to achieve the stipulated CRAR by 1994, other banks were 
provided another couple of years to achieve these norms. The capital adequacy norms were 
further raised to 9 per cent in 2000. Second, in 2000, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
introduced a provisioning of a minimum of 0.25 per cent on standard loans. This measure 
was more in response to stimulus from domestic forces. These measures were calibrated 
during the crisis, wherein the provisions were raised over a period of time, initially to 0.40 
per cent and thereafter to a peak of 2 per cent in January 2007 before being subsequently 
lowered. Finally beginning 1993, the norms for recognizing a loan as non-performing have 
been gradually rationalized, in line with international best practices. Accordingly, the time 
period for classifying a loan as “sub-standard” was gradually reduced from the initial 12 
months to 3 months (90 days) by 2004. Concomitantly, the period for classifying a loan as 
“doubtful” was also lowered, from 24 months at the beginning of reforms to 12 months by 
2005. We investigate the impact of these macroprudential measures on the performance and 
soundness of the banking sector. 
Akin to Besley and Burgess (2004), we code the macroprudential measures as follows. 
In case there is an increase (resp., decrease) or a tightening (resp., weakening) of a measure 
in a given year, it is coded as +1 (resp., -1). Provided there is no change in the measure 
during the year, it is coded as zero. The raw scores across the sub-categories under each of 
the macroprudential measures are cumulated to arrive at an aggregate index in a given year.  
As a result, a value greater than one for a given macroprudential measure in a year would 
signify a tightening; reverse would be the case in case the value is less than one. The 
macroprudential measure is deemed neutral in case the value of the index in a year equals 
zero.   
 
3. Literature Review 
A significant body of literature has examined the impact of deregulation on bank 
behaviour. It is possible to broadly distinguish two strands of literature. The first is primarily 
theoretical in nature, while the second is more empirical in its scope.  
The theoretical literature has focused on the interrelationship among financial 
deregulation, market power and risk-taking by banks. Hellmann et al. (2000) contend that 
capital requirements alone may not be enough to curtail bank risk and additional 
requirements could be useful to reduce risk in a competitive environment. Diamond and 
Rajan (2000, 2001) suggest that well-capitalised banks might not be conducive to liquidity 
creation, simply because higher capital lowers bank weaknesses. More recent research 
indicates that the relation between deregulation and bank behaviour may not be 
unambiguous (Boyd et al., 2006). 
Empirical research into the above models report mixed findings. According to the 
first strand, the impact of financial deregulation is typically assessed either through a dummy 
variable (Salas and Saurina, 2003) or simply examining the behaviour of banks during 
periods of financial deregulation (Das and Ghosh, 2006). The findings indicate that the 
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impact of deregulation on bank behaviour depends, among others, on the state of the 
banking system and differs significantly across bank ownership.  
The second strand of the literature focuses on the impact of financial deregulation on 
bank performance. Cross-country studies (Maudos and Pastor, 2001) report improvements in 
performance, post-deregulation. However, given the difficulties inherent in cross-country 
comparisons (Rodrik, 2012), studies have also been conducted at the country-level. At the 
country level, studies have examined, among others, the performance of banks in the US 
(Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999), Norway (Berg et al., 1992), 
Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998), Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998) and Taiwan (Shyu, 
1998).  
In the Indian case, studies have focused on the impact of financial deregulation on 
efficiency and productivity as also the impact of specific regulatory measures on bank 
performance. In an early study on Indian banks for 1986–91, Bhattacharya et al. (1997) found 
that state-owned banks were the best performing banks in terms of efficiency. Kumbhakar 
and Sarkar (2003) show evidence to suggest that regulatory reform did not exert any 
perceptible impact on total factor productivity growth. Das and Ghosh (2006) attribute the 
high cost inefficiency of banks to the under-utilization of resources. Zhao et al. (2010) 
reported that, by increasing competition, greater deregulation encouraged banks to increase 
risk-taking. More recently, Casu et al. (2013) report a positive effect of deregulation on total 
factor productivity (TFP) for Indian commercial banks covering the period 1992-2004. 
4. The database and sample 
Bank-wise data on commercial banks spanning the period 1992 through 2012 are 
culled out from the various issues of Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India. This 
publication by Reserve Bank of India provides the annual audited data on the balance sheet 
and profit and loss accounts of individual banks. The financial year for banks runs from the 
first day of April of a particular year to the last day of March of the subsequent year. 
Accordingly, the year 1992 corresponds to the period 1991–92 (April–March) and so on, for 
the other years. The data has the advantage of being perfectly comparable across banks, 
with the central bank acting as the regulator of the financial system makes it mandatory for 
the financial entities to present their balance sheets in the same format and criteria.  
 The sample comprises of all state-owned banks (SOBs), which account for around 75 
per cent of total banking assets, 20 domestic private banks (DPBs), including 5 de novo 
private banks (which became operational after the initiation of reforms), which account for 
around 15 per cent of banking assets and 16 foreign banks (FBs), accounting for roughly 7 
per cent of total banking assets. The excluded private and foreign banks are those which 
have become operational only recently and therefore, lack a consistent time series of 
relevant variables. The de novo private banks became operational only since 1996. As a 
result, the number of reporting banks witnessed a sharp increase thereafter. Subsequently, 
the banking industry also witnessed some consolidation, both domestic and internationally. 
We also include a dummy variable for take this aspect on board. As a result, we have an 
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unbalanced panel, with a minimum of 58 banks at the beginning of the sample to a 
maximum of 64 banks.  
Table 2: Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable Empirical definition 
Data 
source 
No. 
Obs Mean SD. 
Bank-level: Dependent 
RoA Return on asset=Net profit/Total asset STB 1307 0.008 0.019 
NIM Net interest margin = (Interest income – 
interest expense)/Total asset 
RTP 1307 0.031 0.026 
Ln(1+Z) Z-score of banks defined as: 
Z=[(K/A)+(RoA/A)]/SD(RoA) 
where K=capital; A=asset and SD=3-year 
rolling standard deviation 
STB 1289 1.423 0.491 
Gr_Advances (Advt –Advt-1)/Assett-1 STB 1245 0.110 0.196 
Bank-level: Independent 
LTA Log (total asset) STB 1307 5.957 0.805 
SHTA Total assets of bank b in year t/ Total bank 
assets in year t 
STB 1321 0.016 0.021 
DDEP Demand deposits/ Total deposits STB 1304 0.105 0.054 
NINT Non-interest income/ Total asset STB 1307 0.018 0.019 
GDPGR Real GDP growth in year t HSIE 1344 0.067 0.020 
Ownership: Independent 
SOB Unity if bank is state-owned, else zero RTP 1344 0.438 0.496 
DPB Unity if bank is domestic private, else zero RTP 1344 0.297 0.457 
FB Unity if the bank is foreign, else zero RTP 1344 0.266 0.442 
Macroprudential: Independent 
CRAR Coded=1 (resp.,-1) in case of an increase 
(resp., decrease) in a given year, else zero 
RTP 1344 0.095 0.294 
PROV Coded=1 (resp., -1) in case of tightening 
(resp., weakening) in a given year, else zero 
RTP 1344 0.238 0.426 
LOAN Coded=1 (resp.,-1) in case of tightening (resp., 
weakening) in a given year, else zero 
RTP 1344 0.143 0.467 
Other dummies: Independent 
d_merger Dummy=1 for the acquirer bank in the year 
of merger, else zero 
Computed 
based on 
RTP & RCF
1344 0.018 0.132 
HSIE: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 
RCF: Report on Currency and Finance 
RTP: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 
STB: Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India 
 
With an average of 20.2 years of observations per bank, there are a maximum of 1307 
bank-years. The macroeconomic variables are obtained from the Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy, a yearly Indian central bank publication which provides time-series 
information on the macroeconomic variables. Table 2 provides a description of the relevant 
variables, including the data source and summary statistics. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Univariate tests 
Table 3 reports comparisons of various measures of performance, as indicated earlier. 
The results indicate a clear divergence across ownership. These differences in most cases 
appear to be economically important, as well. For example, the average NIM for FBs is 3.4 
per cent, which is significantly higher as compared to SOBs and DPBs. Return on asset 
displays the greatest variation, especially for SOBs. Their average RoA is 0.6 per cent, which 
is around 50 per cent lower than that obtaining for DPBs and roughly half as compared to 
FBs. All these differences are statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
Table 3: Univariate tests: Differences in performance across bank ownership 
Variable RoA NIM In (1+Z) Gr_Advances No. banks 
SOB 0.006  
(0.017) 
0.031 
(0.036) 
1.462 
(0.511) 
0.105  
(0.199) 
28 
DPB 0.009  
(0.007) 
0.027 
(0.008) 
1.529 
(0.453) 
0.143  
(0.178) 
19 
FB 0.012  
(0.028) 
0.034 
(0.017) 
1.259 
(0.451) 
0.084  
(0.203) 
17 
t-test of difference 
SOB vs. DPB -3.634*** 3.157*** -2.092** -2.991***  
SOB vs. FB 3.637*** -2.190** 6.345*** 2.532***  
DPB vs. FB -2.057** -7.384*** -8.004*** 4.076***  
Standard deviation in brackets 
***, ** & * denote statistical significance at the 1,5 & 10 per cent level, respectively 
 
The results on Z-score and credit growth are no less striking. FBs have statistically 
significant lower Z-score as well as credit growth as compared to other bank groups. To 
illustrate, credit growth for FBs is roughly 9 per cent, which is significantly lower as 
compared to 14.3 per cent growth obtaining for DPBs. Overall, the results in table 3 appear 
to suggest that FBs have the highest margins and profitability, although their stability and 
credit growth are the lowest across ownership.    
5.2 Multivariate regression 
We control for the factors mentioned above in a multivariate regression framework. 
Akin to Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and Micco 
et al. (2007), measures of performance are regressed on a set of controls (X) included with a 
lag to account for endogeneity and take on board the macroprudential regulation. 
Accordingly, the reduced form specification assumes the following form: 
tststts
tttstts
XGDPGRFB
PRUGDPGRSOBPerf
,1,21,
321,,
')(
)(
ugbb
aaah
+++
++++=
-
                                                     (2) 
In (2), GDPGR measures the real GDP growth in year t, and PRU (PRU=CRAR, LOAN, PROV) is 
the particular macroprudential measure.  
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The main coefficient of interest is α3. This coefficient measures the impact of 
implementation of a given macroprudential measure on state-owned banks (the main effect 
of macroprudential norms is controlled through year effects). We control for the interaction 
between ownership and GDP growth, because state-owned and foreign banks might 
respond differently to the business cycle as compared to domestic private banks. This would 
not be a problem if the business cycles were uncorrelated with the prudential measures, 
although such a correlation cannot be ruled out (Micco et al., 2007).  
The regressions include a standard set of bank-specific controls, including (log of) 
total assets (LTA), bank-wise asset share (SHTA) in a given year, demand deposits (DDEP) and 
fee income (NINT).  
Table 4 reports the results for return on asset, interest margins, soundness and credit 
growth. Take for instance, Column 1. The results suggest that, as compared with DPBs, SOBs 
have higher profitability during periods of economic expansion, although their profitability is 
reduced after imposition of capital adequacy norms. The impact of the macroprudential 
measure is economically meaningful, as well. To see this, consider the differential in 
profitability of the average SOB and the average DPB in a year in which real GDP grew by 6.7 
per cent, the average growth rate in the sample. Ignoring the impact of capital standards, the 
differential equals 0.011 per cent points. Taking on board the impact of capital adequacy 
norms, the point estimates of Col. 1 yield a difference of 0.023 per cent points, an increase of 
over 100 per cent with respect to the no-capital imposition benchmark. In a similar fashion, 
in case of both loan classification and provisioning practices (Cols. 2 and 3), the difference in 
profitability works out to be 85 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively.  
Similar results are echoed when we focus on interest margins. More specifically, the 
evidence indicates that interest margins of SOBs tend to be higher during periods of 
economic expansion and lower after imposition of macroprudential norms. Again, the 
coefficient on the macroprudential dummy is quite large and indicates that the differential 
between the interest margin of state-owned and private banks more than quadruples after 
imposition of capital adequacy norms (assuming 6.7 per cent GDP growth, the two values 
are -0.003 and -0.015). Similar, although of slightly lower order of magnitude, are in 
evidence when the provisioning and loan classification norms are considered. This provides 
evidence that the macroprudential channel is at work: the decline in profitability is driven to 
an extent by the lower margins.  
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Table 4: Regression results: Analysis of bank performance 
 Dep variable = RoA Dep variable = NIM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOB -0.019  
(0.004)*** 
-0.011  
(0.001)*** 
-0.017  
(0.003)*** 
-0.010  
(0.002)*** 
-0.011  
(0.003)*** 
-0.009  
(0.001)*** 
FB -0.005  
(0.007) 
-0.004  
(0.007) 
-0.004  
(0.007) 
0.013  
(0.005)*** 
0.014  
(0.005)*** 
0.014  
(0.005)*** 
SOB* GDPGR 0.125  
(0.024)*** 
0.129  
(0.031)*** 
0.134  
(0.023)*** 
0.110  
(0.053)** 
0.136  
(0.072)* 
0.117  
(0.052)** 
FB*GDPGR 0.064  
(0.089) 
0.063  
(0.089) 
0.063  
(0.090) 
-0.179  
(0.074)*** 
-0.181 
(0.074)*** 
-0.180  
(0.074)*** 
SOB*CRAR -0.012  
(0.002)*** 
  -0.012  
(0.002)*** 
  
SOB*PROV  -0.002  
(0.001)** 
  -0.005  
(0.002)** 
 
SOB*LOAN   -0.005  
(0.001)*** 
  -0.006  
(0.002)*** 
Period 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
N.Obs; N.banks 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 
R2 0.1662 0.1585 0.1614 0.1899 0.1854 0.1876 
 p-Value of F-test on joint significance of SOB*GDPGR and FB*GDPGR 
 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Dep variable = Ln (1+Z) Dep variable = Gr_Advances 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
SOB -0.141  
(0.055)*** 
-0.117  
(0.059)* 
-0.124  
(0.056)** 
-0.059  
(0.025)** 
-0.061  
(0.026)** 
-0.057  
(0.029)* 
FB -0.401  
(0.129)*** 
-0.403  
(0.129)*** 
-0.407 
(0.129)*** 
-0.077  
(0.058) 
-0.076  
(0.059) 
-0.076  
(0.059) 
SOB* GDPGR -2.226  
(1.109)** 
-3.911  
(1.524)*** 
-2.639  
(1.537)* 
0.841  
(0.453)* 
0.856  
(0.659) 
1.072  
(0.683) 
FB* GDPGR 2.797  
(1.802) 
2.827  
(1.803) 
2.868  
(1.805) 
-0.032  
(0.889) 
-0.035  
(0.892) 
-0.039  
(0.891) 
SOB*CRAR 0.216  
(0.048)*** 
  -0.004  
(0.002)** 
  
SOB*PROV  0.212  
(0.045)*** 
  0.016  
(0.018) 
 
SOB*LOAN   -0.236  
(0.059)*** 
  0.011   
(0.022) 
Period 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
N.Obs; N.banks 1280; 64 1280; 64 1280; 64 1243; 64 1243; 64 1243; 64 
R2 0.2597 0.2687 0.2701 0.0604 0.0582 0.0580 
 p-Value of F-test on joint significance of SOB*GDPGR and FB*GDPGR 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.30 0.19 
Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 per cent level, respectively 
All specifications include the relevant controls, but they are not reported to conserve space 
 
Cols. (7) to (9) focus on bank soundness. The evidence indicates that the soundness 
of SOBs declines during periods of economic growth, although macroprudential norms exert 
a salutary impact. More specifically, capital adequacy and provisioning norms improve 
soundness, whereas loan classification norms lower it. The magnitude of the 
macroprudential effect in all cases is extremely large. In case of provisioning norms for 
example, the point estimates indicate that the differential between the soundness of SOBs 
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and DPBs halves after imposition of such norms (with 6.7 per cent GDP growth, the two 
values are -0.38 and -0.17).  
The final three columns focus on credit growth. In particular, we find that SOBs lower 
their loan growth after imposition of capital norms. In Col.10 for example, the differential 
between credit growth of SOBs and DPBs works out to be over 100 per cent (the two values 
are equal to -0.003 and -0.007 respectively, assuming 6.7 per cent GDP growth).  
In other words, the evidence indicates that the state-owned banks are less profitable 
than private banks and the difference in performance is accentuated after imposition of 
macroprudential norms.  
One possible way to interpret these findings could be the following. One major focus 
of macroprudential policies has been to improve the resilience of the banking system by 
creating a cushion for expected and unexpected losses. With state-owned banks being major 
players in the system in terms of both size and banking space (Subbarao, 2013), this would 
have entailed an improvement in their soundness in the long-run, perhaps at the cost of 
trading-off short-term profitability considerations. When weighed on a long-term basis, it 
seems likely that the pros of such regulations outweigh the cons so as to provide resilience 
and help in nurturing a stable and sustainable financial system through the cycle. 
It might be argued that some of the control variables employed, such as non-interest 
income and demand deposits, might be endogenous. To circumvent this possibility, the 
baseline model is re-estimated after deleting these variables. The results are observed to be 
similar to those obtained earlier. In addition, acknowledging the importance of liquidity and 
capital in bank behavior, the model is augmented with measures which proxy for these 
factors. Our main results remain unaltered after inclusion of these variables.  
Another issue of relevance is that SOBs are much larger than other banks. This raises 
the question of whether differences in the effects of regulation between state-owned banks 
and other banks were driven by the ownership structure, or by economies of scale (especially 
since bank size was included as a control variable). To examine this further, we re-estimate 
the baseline specification, weighing each observation by the bank’s share of total assets 
(Levy-Yeyati and Micco, 2007 for the advantages of this approach). Our main results remain 
materially unchanged in this case. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
Financial sector reforms in India, undertaken as part of the overall process of reforms 
since the early 1990s, were aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity of the 
financial sector. While there have been several studies on bank performance, these papers 
do not pay adequate attention to the important policy dimensions of prudential 
deregulation and their impact on bank performance.  
In this context, the present study employs panel data techniques to examine the 
impact of three important macroprudential measures - capital adequacy norms, provisioning 
requirements and tightening of loan classification norms - on the performance of Indian 
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banks since the 1990. We focus on four major firm characteristics: profitability, margins, 
soundness and credit growth. The analysis indicates that the state-owned banks are less 
profitable than private banks and the difference in performance is accentuated after 
imposition of macroprudential norms. These results are quite robust. It is apparent in simple 
univariate comparisons as well as in multivariate regressions that takes on board several 
control variables.  
Summing up, the balance of evidence indicates that different measures of 
macroprudential regulation exert differential impact on banks across ownership. These 
divergences could, for example, be the outcome of differences in their business models, 
product sophistication, customer orientation, risk appetite as well as human and other 
infrastructural efficiencies. It, therefore, appears important for policymakers to take a holistic 
view of all prudential measures and their potential impact on the banking system in order to 
avoid possible pitfalls. Contextually, Rajan (2009) has argued that, in order to ensure that 
regulations are cycle-proof, it is important that they are premised on 3-Cs: comprehensive, 
contingent and cost-effective. In other words, by being applied comprehensively to all 
levered financial firms and being contingent on the overall state of the economy, they would 
discourage regulatory arbitrage and ensure cost-effectiveness and therefore, be less prone 
to dilution.  
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